There is now compelling evidence that motor imagery (MI) promotes motor learning. While MI has been shown to influence the early stages of the learning process, recent data revealed that sleep also contributes to the consolidation of the memory trace. How such “online” and “offline” processes take place and how they interact to impact the neural underpinnings of movements has received little attention. The aim of the present review is twofold: i) providing an overview of recent applied and fundamental studies (...) investigating the effects of MI practice on motor learning, and ii) detangling applied and fundamental findings in support of a sleep contribution to motor consolidation after MI practice. We conclude with an integrative approach of online and offline learning resulting from intense MI practice in healthy participants, and underline research avenues in the motor learning/clinical domains. (shrink)

In this article, I side with those who argue that the debate about the definition of “disease” should be reoriented from the question “what is disease” to the question of what it should be. However, I ground my argument on the rejection of the naturalist approach to define disease and the adoption of a normativist approach, according to which the concept of disease is normative and value-laden. Based on this normativist approach, I defend two main theses: (1) that conceptual analysis (...) is not the right method to define disease and that conceptual engineering should be the preferred method and (2) that the method of conceptual engineering should be implemented following the principles of Alexandrova’s account of social objectivity in the context of the definition of disease. (shrink)

Au Québec, le régime d’examen des plaintes dans le réseau de la santé et des services sociaux contribue à l’amélioration continue des soins en permettant aux usagers de partager leur insatisfaction auprès d’une instance indépendante pouvant émettre des recommandations aux établissements. Le régime permet ainsi de renforcer la participation active de l’usager et donc de démocratiser les soins et services. En plus de sa parenté évidente avec cet objectif d’autonomisation, la bioéthique est omniprésente dans le travail des instances responsables de (...) l’application du régime, soit les commissariats aux plaintes. Cet article met en lumière l’usage implicite de concepts issus de la bioéthique dans le travail quotidien des commissariats aux plaintes. Nous y abordons l’autonomie, sous l’angle de l’autodétermination et de la confidentialité dans l’analyse de la recevabilité des plaintes. Nous y abordons également la justice, sous l’angle de l’équité dans l’allocation des ressources et de la justice épistémique dans le traitement des plaintes. Ensuite, nous abordons les similitudes entre les méthodologies de la bioéthique et du régime d’examen des plaintes, nommément les grilles d’analyse en éthique clinique et la narrativité. Finalement, nous abordons l’importance de l’impartialité, de l’indépendance et de la transparence dans le travail des commissariats aux plaintes. Nous concluons en offrant des pistes de réflexion en vue d’une mise à jour des connaissances empiriques concernant la concrétisation des objectifs de renforcement de la participation de l’usager dans ses soins et de démocratisation des soins et services. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:One recent body of work has concerned medicalization and how it can create epistemic injustice. It focuses on medicalization as a hermeneutical process that shapes the conceptual framework(s) we use to refer to some conditions/experiences. In parallel, some scholars with lived experience of madness have started to explore the epistemic harms suffered by the Mad community. Building on this, I argue that the process of medicalization in psychiatry affects the Mad community in a specific way that has been overlooked in (...) the literature on medicalization and epistemic injustice. That is, medicalization can create what is called "contributory injustice." This form of injustice occurs when marginalized communities have been able to create alternative hermeneutical resources, but these resources are dismissed or discredited by the dominant group. I argue that the emerging field of Mad Studies is a victim of this type of injustice when Mad experiences are unilaterally medicalized. (shrink)

The first two parts of the book are lectures given by Dr. Cuénot at the first annual conference in October 1966 of the Pierre Teilhard de Chardin Association of Great Britain and Ireland. Then follows a comment made by Professor Garaudy at the conference. The text concludes with an original essay by Dr. Cuénot which examines Teilhard's influence on contemporary thinkers.

In this paper, my goal is to use an epistemic injustice framework to extend an existing normative analysis of over-medicalization to psychiatry and thus draw attention to overlooked injustices. Kaczmarek has developed a promising bioethical and pragmatic approach to over-medicalization, which consists of four guiding questions covering issues related to the harms and benefits of medicalization. In a nutshell, if we answer “yes” to all proposed questions, then it is a case of over-medicalization. Building on an epistemic injustice framework, I (...) will argue that Kaczmarek’s proposal lacks guidance concerning the procedures through which we are to answer the four questions, and I will import the conceptual resources of epistemic injustice to guide our thinking on these issues. This will lead me to defend more inclusive decision-making procedures regarding medicalization in the DSM. Kaczmarek’s account complemented with an epistemic injustice framework can help us achieve better forms of medicalization. I will then use a contested case of medicalization, the creation of Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder in the DSM-5 to illustrate how the epistemic injustice framework can help to shed light on these issues and to show its relevance to distinguish good and bad forms of medicalization. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for a new way to understand the integration of facts and values in the concept of mental disorder that has the potential to avoid the flaws of previous hybrid approaches. I import conceptual tools from the account of procedural objectivity defended by Helen Longino to resolve the controversy over the definition of mental disorder. My argument is threefold: I first sketch the history of the debate opposing objectivists and constructivists and focus on the criticisms that (...) led to the emergence of the debate. Second, I offer a reconstruction of the “Natural Function Approach” argument to make explicit an unsound assumption underlying this approach. The reconstruction will allow me to show that the NFO’s argument depends on the ideal of value-free science that I will criticize. Then I propose an alternative ideal for psychiatry: social objectivity. I argue that the concept of mental health should be seen as “socially objective” rather than value-free, moving the debate towards the social procedures by which the definition is produced rather than the normative and factual content of its definition. (shrink)

First, I want to thank PPP for the privilege of having my work read and commented on by esteemed colleagues. In this response, I briefly review some of the key issues that they have raised. These issues include 1) the usefulness of a definition of mental disorder for North American psychiatry, 2) the absence of a concrete criterion to address the demarcation problem, 3) the place and role of values in such a demarcation, and 4) the worries of over-inclusiveness, problematic (...) values and imposition of values.The first question that needs to be clarified is raised by Waterman's commentary : Is it really necessary to define mental disorder and mental health? Here I feel I should clarify a background assumption of... (shrink)

La création récente du diagnostic de trouble dysphorique prémenstruel (TDPM) dans le DSM-5 a été contestée sous de multiples angles. Les principales critiques mettent en avant les lacunes en faveur de la validité du TDPM, ainsi que le risque de pathologisation et de stigmatisation des changements physiques et comportementaux vécus par les femmes pendant leur phase prémenstruelle. Pour éclairer cette controverse, j’emprunte certains outils du cadre conceptuel des injustices épistémiques (IE) développé par Miranda Fricker. Plus précisément, je vais me baser (...) sur de récents travaux qui ont tenté d’appliquer ce cadre aux processus de catégorisation en médecine et en psychiatrie. Cela me permettra de mettre au jour un angle mort du débat actuel sur le TDPM, soit les perspectives des personnes touchées par ces symptômes. Ces points de vue ont été généralement négligés, mais le cadre des IE nous permet de recentrer le débat sur les intérêts et les besoins des personnes affectées par les processus de catégorisation psychiatrique. (shrink)

In this paper, we want to take a critical stance towards Tsou’s recent proposal that a neuro-oriented version of the homeostatic property cluster kind model (MPCK) should be an ideal for the DSM. Our strategy will be to discuss the creation of the Social Pragmatic Communication Disorder (SPCD) in DSM-5 to show the limits of MPCK as an ideal for the next DSM deliberations over a set of diagnoses revisions. We argue that an ideal model for the DSM should address (...) the issues of deep uncertainties and pragmatic considerations to be useful in this context. (shrink)

In the context of academic research, a diversity of ethical issues, conditioned by the different roles of members within these institutions, arise. Previous studies on this topic addressed mainly the perceptions of researchers. However, to our knowledge, no studies have explored the transversal ethical issues from a wider spectrum, including other members of academic institutions as the research ethics board (REB) members, and the research ethics experts. The present study used a descriptive phenomenological approach to document the ethical issues experienced (...) by a heterogeneous group of Canadian researchers, REB members, and research ethics experts. Data collection involved socio-demographic questionnaires and individual semi-structured interviews. Following the triangulation of different perspectives (researchers, REB members and ethics experts), emerging ethical issues were synthesized in ten units of meaning: (1) research integrity, (2) conflicts of interest, (3) respect for research participants, (4) lack of supervision and power imbalances, (5) individualism and performance, (6) inadequate ethical guidance, (7) social injustices, (8) distributive injustices, (9) epistemic injustices, and (10) ethical distress. This study highlighted several problematic elements that can support the identification of future solutions to resolve transversal ethical issues in research that affect the heterogeneous members of the academic community. (shrink)

During presidential campaigns, party members often operate Facebook pages or groups concurrently with the official communications of their respective political parties. However, there is limited evidence regarding the true motivations of these partisans, and how their efforts supplement the online strategies of the parties. Our study is based on interviews conducted with party members who ran Facebook pages to support a candidate during the 2022 French presidential campaign. It sheds light on how they managed their Facebook pages, often autonomously, to (...) serve as supplementary tools to their grassroots tactics and ultimately to bring the campaign closer to the voters. This finding highlights the emergence of a hybrid model of online campaign organization, the partisan-managed campaigning model, which challenges both the traditional top-down model, in which the campaign is managed by the central party, and the more recent citizen-initiated campaign model. (shrink)

In the debate over the definition of ‘mental health,’ three different approaches are generally distinguished: the normativist approach (Szasz, Sarbin), the hybrid approach (Wakefield) and the naturalistic approach (Boorse). This paper qualifies this classification by clarifying the sense in which Christopher Boorse defends a naturalistic approachvis-à-visthe central concepts of psychiatry. This paper also clarifies in what way Boorse is opposed to the normativist approach advocated by some authors of the anti-psychiatric movement, such as Szasz.

"Apprendre, qu'est-ce que cela veut dire? Qu'est-ce que cela suppose? Par quelles voies est-ce que cela passe? A ces questions, l'école contemporaine apporte une réponse catégorique : l'école traditionnelle s'est trompée, elle a voulu transmettre des connaissances détenues par un maître en les inculquant à des élèves passifs. Cette pédagogie de l'imposition ne marche pas. Il faut lui substituer une pédagogie active faisant de l'enfant l'acteur de la construction de ses savoirs. Nous sommes au moment où cette réponse se révèle (...) aussi fausse, dans sa demi-vérité, que la philosophie antérieure. Il en résulte que l'école aujourd'hui est plongée dans une incertitude complète sur la nature de l'opération qu'il lui revient d'effectuer. Tout est à reprendre, à commencer par l'opposition supposée entre activité de l'élève et transmission du savoir. C'est ce problème fondamental que ce livre s'efforce d'éclairer." [Extrait de la 4e de couv.]. (shrink)

Psychiatric language and concepts, and the norms they embed, have come to influence more and more areas of our daily lives. This has recently been described as a feature of the ‘psychiatrization of society.’ This paper looks at one aspect of psychiatrization that is still little studied in the literature: the psychiatrization of our emotional lives. The paper develops an extended account of emotion pathologizing as a form of affective injustice that is related to psychiatrization and that specifically harms psychopathologized (...) people, i.e., people who are socially perceived to be mentally ill. After introducing an initial account of emotion pathologizing as articulated in Pismenny et al. (2024), we extend the account by demonstrating how processes and practices of emotion pathologizing are informed by (1) the dominant biomedical approach to psychiatry and (2) sanism, a system of discrimination and oppression that disadvantages people who have received a psychiatric diagnosis, or are perceived as in need of psychiatric treatment. We then argue that emotion pathologizing can manifest as an affect-related hermeneutical injustice that disadvantages psychopathologized individuals by unfairly constraining how they make sense of and understand their own emotional experiences. (shrink)

Patient self-disclosure is essential to the work of health professionals, and this is even more critical in mental health where speech is a reflection of the content of thought. Self-disclosure is then about invisible symptoms that are associated with health problems where discrimination and stigmatization are still very prevalent. This article explores the ethical issues of this phenomenon which has received very little study. Disclosure as a decision-making, interpersonal, dynamic and complex process will be defined and deepened with the help (...) of examples from research. Subsequently, the vulnerability of the person who discloses will be addressed, followed by issues of quality of care and related to the standards of professional practice associated with patient disclosure and their associated responsibility. These elements highlight many ethical issues and ultimately lead us to a proposal to situate the professionals involved. (shrink)

Anne-Marie Gagné-Julien et Pierre-Olivier Méthot Durant les deux dernières décennies, plusieurs questions classiques de la philosophie de la médecine et de la psychiatrie ont connu un renouvellement. Des angles de recherche jusqu’alors peu explorés font désormais l’objet de vifs débats, et les questions traditionnelles ont été réinterprétées à la lumière de ces nouveaux développements. En examinant ces récents thèmes grâce aux contributions de chercheur.e.s francophones, ce dossier vise à nourrir la progression de cette « nouvelle » philosophie de (...) la médecine et de la psychiatrie, à apporter un éclairage inédit sur certains de ses domaines et de ses objets encore méconnus de même que sur ses courants et ses problématiques émergents, et ainsi à faire avancer des débats classiques sous des angles nouveaux. (shrink)

The anti-psychiatry movement of the 20th century has notably denounced the role of values and social norms in the shaping of psychiatric categories. Recent activist movements also recognize that psychiatry is value-laden, however, they do not fight for a value-free psychiatry. On the contrary, some activist movements of the 21st century advocate for self-advocacy in sciences of mental health in order to reach a more accurate understanding of psychiatric categories/mental distress. By aiming at such epistemic gain, they depart from the (...) anti-psychiatry movement. Through the analysis of the epistemic and political influence of two of these movements – Neurodiversity and the Mad Studies, we show how this new activism has taken a scientific turn compatible with current philosophical scientific frameworks, while still developing a critical approach on psychiatry. (shrink)

The impact of emotion on executive functioning is gaining interest. It has led to the differentiation of “cool” Executive Functioning processes, such as cognitive flexibility, and “hot” EF processes, such as affective flexibility. But how does affective flexibility, the ability to switch between cognitive and affective information, vary as a function of age and sex? How does this construct relate to “cool” executive functioning and cognitive-emotion regulation processes? In this study, 266 participants, including 91 adolescents and 175 adults, completed a (...) cognitive–affective switching task with specific unpredictable switches, as well as measures of inhibition, attention, and cognitive-emotion coping strategies. We expected cognitive to affective switching to be more costly than affective to cognitive switching in females versus males, as well as higher switch costs in adolescents. Using linear mixed modelling, we analysed the effect of age, sex, and types of switching on reaction time. Results show that adolescents are slower switchers than adults, and demonstrate that females, although faster switchers than males, are slower when switching from cognitive to affective content than when they are switching from affective to cognitive content. Multiple regression analyses revealed age-specific associations between cognitive-affective switching and inhibition. These results converge with reported developmental and gender specificities in EF and emotion processing, respectively. Additionally, affective flexibility could relate to differences in vigilance and inhibition. (shrink)

La gestion des compétences et son principal instrument, le référentiel de compétences, sont très répandus dans les grandes organisations canadiennes publiques et privées. La compétence éthique y est de plus en plus intégrée, sans toutefois qu’elle soit clairement définie. L’usage de ces référentiels pour « gérer » la compétence éthique des employés et des cadres pose également de nombreux enjeux pratiques et éthiques dont on doit prendre la mesure si l’on veut prétendre œuvrer à son développement. Ce texte vise à (...) mettre en lumière certains de ces enjeux et ainsi offrir quelques pistes de réflexion pour de futures recherches et pour les intervenants qui souhaitent intégrer la compétence éthique dans les référentiels. (shrink)

Les effets émotionnels que produisent l’arrivée et l’éducation d’un enfant polyhandicapé dans sa famille sont peu étudiés. La communication empathique avec l’enfant est mise à mal, le travail de contenance maternelle s’en trouve parfois défaillant. L’auteur met ainsi en relief deux défenses. Le comportement de dépendance émotionnelle active apparaît à la fois comme une compétence nécessaire pour décoder les états affectifs de l’enfant mais aussi comme un mécanisme de défense destiné à colmater l’angoisse. Le « recours à la médicalisation » (...) désigne un comportement qui ne parvient pas à considérer la réalité psychique de l’enfant. (shrink)